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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER § 1983:
TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF
MUNICIPAL POLICYMAKER
STEVEN STEIN CUSHMAN *
In City of St. Louis u Praprotnik,' the United States Supreme Court
attempted to resolve the vexing question of when acts by municipal
officials or employees may trigger municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.2 The Supreme Court had hoped to put to rest questions that
had troubled it since Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services. 3 In Monell, the Court held that municipalities' may be found
liable under § 1983 only where a municipal policy or custom causes a
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York
City Law Department. B.A. 1984, Washington University in St. Louis; J.D. 1987, Harvard Law
School. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the position of the New York City Law Department.
The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and editorial assistance of Elissa Stein
Cushman, as well as the comments of Neil Corwin. Additional thanks to Jerry Frug for his
comments On a draft of this article.
1 485 U.S. 112,114 (1988).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3 See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 121-24 (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
4 A "municipality" for purposes of § 1983 litigation includes not only city government but
also other similar local governmental entities. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469,483 n.12 (1986) (counties are subject to suit under § 1983). "Municipality" is used through.
out this Article as a generic label for local government entities under § 1983.
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deprivation of federal rights, but the Court did not elaborate on what
constitutes municipal policy.° Praprotnik establishes municipal policy as
the directives of only those officials expressly identified by state or local
law as having final policymaking authority.° Praprotnik, however, ig-
nores the directives set by those officials who exercise policymaking
authority in fact but who are not expressly vested with that authority
by state or local law."' Despite the Praprotnik Court's intention to unify
the law as to when government action implicates a municipal policy,
the contrasting views expressed by circuit courts about when policy-
makers have delegated their policymaking authority and whether cer-
tain officials are per se policymakers demonstrate that Praprotnik has
proven to be an unsuccessful guide.'
The difficulties the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
have faced in defining municipal policy stem from the need to balance
what the Supreme Court has determined to be Congress's conflicting
intentions in passing Section One of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also
known as the Ku Klux Act' and currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
According to the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, Congress passed
the Ku Klux Act primarily to provide a federal remedy to persons
5
 436 U.S. at 694-95.
6
 485 U.S. at 124 (citing Pernbaur, 475 U.S. at 483). There was no majority opinion in
Praprotnik and therefbre determining what Praprotnik established as new law is difficult Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, however, was adopted by a majority of the Court the following year
in Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989), with Justice Kennedy, who did not
participate in Praprotnik, providing the fifth vote. The lower courts have consequently treated
Justice O'Connor's plurality as if it were a majority opinion. See, e.g., Auriernma v. Rice, 957 F.2d
397, 400 (7th Cir. 1992). The ability of Jelt to transform Justice O'Connor's plurality into a
majority opinion, however, should not be overstated. Jett did not require the Court to determine
who has authority to set municipal policy and therefore does not provide a detailed analysis of
that question. For a discussion of what felt did address, see note 110 infra. In addition, the
municipal policy question has repeatedly fractured the Court, with no majority opinion emerging
on the central issue, despite the Court addressing the issue three times in four years. See
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 112; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). Finally, the Court is in transition, with only five Justices who
participated in Praprotnik still present: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Scalia. Given the factiousness of the issue, the absence of any detailed analysis of
the question in Jett, and the Court's turnover in the intervening period, the Court may well revisit
the question of who has authority to set municipal policy with a fresh eye.
7 In Praprotnik, the Court ignored de facto policymakers not only by relying on state and
local law but also by narrowly construing the delegation of policymaking authority. The Court
concluded that the Civil Service Commission's deference to, and in some cases, failure to review,
its appointees' discretionary decisions in individual employment actions did not constitute a
delegation of policymaking authority. U. at 130.
8
 See circuit court opinions cited infra notes 137-77.
"Ku Klux Act, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
The Act was formally entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution to the United States, and for other Purposes."
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deprived of federal rights where local officials were either unable or
unwilling to enforce federal In Monell, the Court interpreted the
Ku Klux Act as creating a fault-based system of liability, under which a
municipality may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its
employees." The Monell Court balanced these conflicting concerns by
rejecting respondeat superior as a basis for municipal liability and
inserting into § 1983 the requirement that the deprivation of a federal
right must occur pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. 12
The years following Monell saw the Supreme Court engaged in an
arduous battle to define the contours of municipal policy. The stakes
were high for municipalities. A relaxed vision, wherein every municipal
official who exercised final authority to act on behalf of the municipal-
ity could create municipal policy, would greatly expand municipal
liability. Conversely, a narrow reading, in which a municipal policy
could be created only by a select few officials holding legal policymak-
ing authority, would greatly restrict municipal liability. The Court in
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle" rejected the expansionist view that all
municipal officials authorized to take final action have authority to set
policy, by holding that a single constitutional violation by a nonpolicy-
making official, that was not shown to be pursuant to an unconstitu-
tional policy, is insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability on a
municipality." The Supreme Court again adopted the narrow view in
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 15 where it decided that municipal liability
only attaches where actions are taken by an official with final authority
to set the policy at issue."
After Pembaur, municipalities and civil rights activists alike anx-
iously awaited direction as to which officials possess final authority. The
Supreme Court, in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, attempted to resolve
that question by relying solely on where state or local law explicitly
places policymaking authority.' 7 Praprotnik therefore ignores those ac-
tions taken by municipal officials who exercise de facto policymaking
authority and allows legal formalism to blind the courts to the actual
policymaking structure practices in a modern municipal bureaucracy."
I° See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
11 Monet!, 436 U.S. at 690-95.
12 kl. at 691, 694.
13 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
14 1d. at 821-24.
15 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
16 Id. at 483-84.
17 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124-25.
IRThis formalistic definition of municipal policymaker, and the resulting restriction of mu-
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Although the Supreme Court intended Praprotnik to close the
door to further questions regarding municipal policy, it has not proven
successful in doing so. Lower courts have taken opposing positions on
whether municipal officials not designated by state or local law as
policymakers may nonetheless be transformed into policymakers by
virtue of the fact that the municipality has vested unreviewable author-
ity to act in those officials. 19
 Moreover, lower courts disagree as to
whether there are certain officials (e.g., mayors) who should be treated
as per se policymakers, regardless of where local law purports to place
policymaking authority. 20
 Those courts that have adopted an expansive
view of municipal policymakers believe a municipality should be
viewed as authorizing the actions of all elected officials and of those
officials whose actions the municipalities have insulated from the re-
view of those policymakers designated by state or local law. In contrast,
those courts that have taken a strict view of municipal policymakers
argue that Praprotnik demands a narrow definition of municipal poli-
cymaker in order to maintain a fault-based system of liability and to
avoid falling into the bottomless spiral of respondeat superior and its
devastating impact on municipal treasuries.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should reject the
narrow view of municipal policy articulated by certain lower courts
after Praprotnik and, in doing so, reconsider Praprotnik's sole reliance
on state and local law to determine policymaking authority. Section I
traces the development of Supreme Court analysis on the question of
nicipal liability under § 1983, is one example of the Rehnquist Court's efforts to restructure the
nation's civil rights laws in order to make it more difficult for plaintiffs who allege that their civil
rights have been violated to prevail. The Rehnquist Court has aggressively restricted the rights of
civil rights plaintiffs. In addition to Praprotnik, see, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
1 l 1 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991) (expert witness fees not recoverable by prevailing plaintiffs under
42 U.S.C. § 1988); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78 (1989) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 does not apply to conduct following the formation of a contract); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989) (burden of proof remains at all times with plaintiff
in Title VII action who bears the burden of persuasion to show that challenged hiring practices
were not justified by a legitimate business purpose). Cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62
(1989) (no bar to adversely affected workers challenging affirmative action programs governed
by consent decrees); City of Richmond IT, J.A, Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-11 (1989) (applying
restrictive standard of review to voluntary governmental affirmative action programs and increas-
ing burden of proof of past discrimination to justify such programs). Congress took note of the
Court's rightward tilt in civil rights cases and overturned, at least in part, West Virginia University
Hospitals, Wards Cove, Patterson, and Martin in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat 1071-1100. Commentators have also noted the Rehnquist Court's restructuring of civil
rights actions. See, e.g., Constance B. Motley, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights Litigation, and Deja
Vu, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 643, 648-55 (1991).
19
 See infra notes 138-70 and accompanying text.
2 r' See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
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municipal policy, culminating in Praprotnik. 21 Section II outlines the
split in the lower courts' interpretations of Praprotnik. 22 Section III
analyzes Praprotnik and the split in the lower courts in light of Con-
gress's objectives in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and argues
that Praprotnik and the narrow view of municipal policymakers subvert
Congress's intention to remove from local governments the power to
decide which federal laws will be enforced." Finally, Section IV offers
a definition of municipal policy that defines municipal policymakers
as elected officials, officials designated by state or local law as policy-
makers, and officials who are de facto policymakers by virtue of the
absence of any review of their actions." This vision of municipal policy
properly balances a fault-based system of municipal liability with the
compelling need to deter violations of federal rights and compensate
victims of improper official action.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
A. Monroe Denies Municipal Liability
The starting point for an informed discussion of modern munici-
pal liability under § 1983 is the landmark 1961 Supreme Court deci-
sion of Monroe v. Pape." In Monroe, the complaint alleged that thirteen
Chicago police officers broke into the plaintiffs' home in the early
morning with neither a search nor an arrest warrant. The complaint
further alleged that the police made the plaintiffs stand naked in the
living room while they ransacked the house. The police then took Mr.
Monroe to the police station, where they detained him on "open"
charges for approximately ten hours and interrogated him about a
recent murder before they released him without charges. During his
detention, Monroe was never presented to a magistrate, although one
was available, and was not permitted to speak with an attorney or with
any family member. The plaintiffs sued the individual police officers
involved and the City of Chicago under § 1983, alleging that the
officers and the City had violated their constitutional rights. 26
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had stated a cause
21 See infra notes 25-136 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 137-77 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
25 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled lry Monett v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
26 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
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of action against the police officers but not against the City, holding
that municipalities are immune from suit under § 1983. 27 The Court
grounded its decision on an extensive analysis of the legislative history
of § 1983, commonly referred to as either the Ku Klux Act of 1871 or
the Civil Rights Act of 1871. In its analysis, the Court highlighted three
principal aims of the Civil Rights Act that necessarily provide the
background for resolving questions of § 1983 application. First, Con-
gress intended the Act to override "any invidious legislation by the
States against the rights or privileges of the citizens." 28 Second, the Act
"provided a remedy [for the deprivation of federal rights under color
of state law] where State law was inadequate."29 Finally, and most
importantly, the Act provided "a federal remedy where the state rem-
edy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." 3° Put
simply, Congress passed § 1983 in order to address its concern that
local officials were either unable or unwilling to enforce the law on an
equal basis.31
Having set forth the purposes of § 1983, the Court turned its
attention to the intended scope of the remedy provided against local
officials. Section 1983 provides a remedy against those persons "who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State" deprive someone of his or her federal rights. 32 The Court
construed "under color O' state law to encompass the "[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."33 Applying
this standard to the individual police officers, the Court had no
difficulty finding that the police officers individually had acted under
color of state law and therefore that plaintiffs properly stated a cause
of action against them under § 1983. 34 The Court concluded that
§ 1983 should be interpreted against the background of tort liability,
which makes people accountable for the natural consequences of their
conduct."
27 Id. at 192.
23 Id. at 173 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 268 (1871)).
29 /d. at 173.
39 Id. at 174.
31 See id. at 176.
n2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
33 MCl/Me, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic,'313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941))
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988), which provides criminal punishment for anyone who
"under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom" deprives any state resident of
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States"). The Monroe Court also relied upon Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-13 (1945)
(reaffirming the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 242 provided in Classic). Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85.
54 1d. at 187.
35 Id.
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Monroe, however, rejected the cause of action against the City of
Chicago on the grounds that Congress did not intend municipalities
to be brought within the definition of persons to whose actions § 1983
liability attached." The Court based this decision primarily on Con-
gress's rejection of the Sherman Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of
1871.37 The Sherman Amendment would have made every county, city
or parish liable for certain acts of violence committed by persons
riotously assembled within its border regardless of whether the locality
exercised any degree of control over the individuals who perpetrated
the violence, and regardless of whether the locality had knowledge that
the violence was occurring or reason to believe that the violence would
be or was occurring." The Sherman Amendment would have in effect
placed an obligation upon local governments to keep the peace. Ac-
cording to the Monroe Court, Congress rejected the Sherman Amend-
ment primarily due to concerns that the Constitution did not authorize
Congress to impose obligations for the administration of state law upon
local governments."
The Sherman Amendment, which would have created an unprece-
dented obligation to keep the peace, is much broader than § 1983,
which provides a federal remedy for the violation of already existing
municipal obligations not to violate the Constitution or other federal
laws. Nevertheless, the Monroe Court used Congress's antagonistic re-
sponse to the Sherman Amendment's proposal to impose municipal
liability for a failure to keep the peace to conclude that Congress did
not intend the word "person" in § 1983 to include municipalities."
After Monroe, a cause of action under § 1983 could only be maintained
against government officials as individuals, not against them in their
official capacity nor against the municipalities for which they worked:"
The result limited compensation for victims whose constitutional rights
had been violated, because they could not reach the deep pockets of
the government treasury. 42
36 Id. at 187,19 l.
37 1d, at 188-4)1 & 11.41.
315 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-89 n.41, for the full text of the proposed amendment.
"Id. at 190. The Quit, however, did not decide the constitutional question of whether
Congress in fact has the authority to make municipalities liable for violations of citizens' civil
rights at the hands of municipal officers. Id. at 191. See also Monell, 436 U.S. at 664.
40 Id. at 191. The Court makes its holding clear, stating that "[s]ince we hold that a municipal
corporation is not a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can any
longer be drawn from [previous] cases." Id. at 191 n.50.
41 The courts treat suits against municipal employees in their official capacities as suits against
the municipality. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,165-66 (1985).
42 Municipal liability, as opposed to personal liability of individual municipal officials or
employees, is important. for two reasons, First, municipal officials in their individual capacities
are protected by qualified immunity and therefore may not be held liable if they acted in good
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B. Monell Adopts Municipal Liability Where Deprivation Occurs as a
Result of a Municipal Policy
Monroe's rejection of municipal liability under § 1983 survived for
seventeen years, until the Supreme Court overruled that holding in
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. 45 In Monell, the
plaintiffs challenged an official policy of the Department of Social
Services ("DSS") and the Board of Education of the City of New York
("Board") that forced pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of
absence before such leaves were medically necessary." The complaint
named DSS, its Commissioner, the Board, its Chancellor, the City of
New York and its Mayor as defendants." The Supreme Court found
that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action, and thus held that
municipalities are "persons" under § 1983 and therefore not wholly
immune from suit."
The Monell Court based its decision upon a fresh analysis of
§ 1983's legislative history. 47
 The Court rejected Monroe's legislative
faith, even if, in fact, their actions were unconstitutional. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at
166-67. The municipality does not have the benefit of this defense. Id. Second, juries may be
reluctant to find against individual defendants or may limit the award, believing the defendant
unable to satisfy a large judgment. See Steve E. Comer, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983:
The Rationale Underlying the Final Authority Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REv. 341, 346 (1991); Jon 0.
Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law
Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 456 (1978). While it is true that many municipalities
indemnify their officials, juries are not informed of this, and many municipalities will not
indemnify for intentional tortious acts. See, e.g., N.Y. GF.NERAL MUNICIPAL Law § 50-1 (McKinney
1986) (city shall indemnify police officer for judgment for damages arising from any negligent
act or other tort committed within the scope of employment as determined by a special panel).
Qualified immunity for actions taken in good faith and the lack of indemnification for intentional
torts may limit the recovery for § 1983 claimants and thus discourage them from bringing suit
at all absent the possibility of municipal liability.
43 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978).
44
 Id. at 661.
45 Id. The plaintiffs stied the individual defendants solely in their official capacities. Id.
46
 Id. at 694-95.
47 Id. at 665. The fact that Monroe stood in opposition to a line of cases upheld by the
Supreme Court which established liability against local school boards under § 1983 no doubt also
influenced the Court. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Monell cited 23 decisions brought
under § 1983 where local school boards had been defendants. Id. at 663 n.5. justice Powell stated
this concern directly:
This line of cases—from Monroe to Kenosha—is difficult to reconcile on a principled
basis with a parallel series of cases in which the Court has assumed sub silentio that
some local government entities could be sued under § 1983. if now, after full
consideration of the question, we continued to adhere to Monroe, grave doubt
would be cast upon the Court's exercise of § 1983 jurisdiction over school
boards.... Since "the principle of blanket immunity established in Monroe cannot
be cabined short of school boards," ... the conflict is squarely presented.
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history analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and instead concluded
that Congress intended to bring municipalities within the ambit of
§ 1983. 48 The Court reevaluated its prior Sherman Amendment analy-
sis by distinguishing between the Sherman Amendment's placement
of new peacekeeping obligations upon municipalities and § 1983's
creation of a federal forum for individuals seeking to enforce munici-
palities' already existing obligation to follow federal constitutional and
statutory requirements.49 Consequently, the Court reasoned, Con-
gress's rejection of the Sherman Amendment should not be equated
with a wholesale rejection of municipal liability under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871."
After distinguishing § 1983 from the Sherman Amendment, the
Court determined that Congress intended the term "persons" to in-
clude municipalities when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871.5 ' The
Court noted both that Congress intended broad construction of the
statute and that municipalities as well as natural persons could create
the harms Congress designed the statute to remedy." Further, the
Court noted that, by 1871, courts had firmly established the practice
of treating corporations as natural persons for purposes of constitu-
tional and statutory analysis in virtually all situations." In addition, the
Court observed that the Dictionary Act of 1871, passed nearly simulta-
neously with the Civil Rights Act of 1871, stated that "the word `person'
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate."54
Monell, however, opened the door to municipal liability only so
far. Examining the same legislative history, the Court determined that
Id. at 710-11 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell
Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983,62 S. CAL.
L, REV. 539, 555 & ti,82 (1989).
*/ Mona, 436 U.S. at 690.
Id. at 670-83 & n.21. The Court noted that the Sherman Amendment would not have
affected § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, currently codified as § 1983. Id. at 665-66. The Court
concluded that Congress would not have believed that including municipalities within § 1 of the
Act would be unconstitutional, even though Congress did believe the Sherman Amendment was
unconstitutional. See id. at 679-83.
•° Id. at 683.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 685-86.
53 Monell, 436 U.S. at 687.
54 !d. at 688. See Dictionary Act, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871), which provides in relevant
part: "[lin all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies
politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in
a more limited sense." The Monroe Court had summarily dismissed the importance of the
Dictionary Act, reading it to be an "allowable" rather than a "mandatory" definition, See. Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191. The Monett Court explicitly rejected such a construction of the
Dictionary Act. See Martell, 436 U.S. at 689 n.53.
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Congress did not intend the traditional tort doctrine of respondeat
superior to apply to municipal liability under § 1983." Emphasizing
the language of the statute, the Court noted that liability attaches
under § 1983 to "any person who . . . shall subject, or cause to be
subjected, any person" to be deprived of his or her constitutional
rights.56 Consequently, the Court observed that liability attaches to a
municipality only when the municipality "causes" an employee to vio-
late someone's rights. 57 The Court viewed the doctrine of respondeat
superior, where liability may be predicated upon the unauthorized acts
of employees, as being incompatible with the requirement that the
municipality "cause" the injury." In addition to § 1983's language, the
Court relied upon Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment."
As previously noted, Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment, in
the Supreme Court's view, because Congress did not believe it had the
authority to obligate municipalities to keep the peace. 6° Accordingly,
the Court reasoned that Congress must not have intended § 1983 to
incorporate respondeat superior liability, because "respondeat supe-
rior would have raised all the constitutional problems associated with
the obligation to keep the peace." 6 '
In place of respondeat superior, the Monell Court articulated an
55 Id. at 691-94. The Court expressly held that "a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor." Id. at 691 (emphasis in original).
55 Id. at 691 (quoting 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988))) .
57 1d. at 692.
58 Id. at 691-92. The Court did not explain why employing an individual and cloaking that
individual with the authority of the state is not a sufficient "cause" to satisfy the statute. Commen-
tators have suggested that the Court, rather than being concerned with the text or legislative
history of § 1983, was instead concerned primarily with striking a balance between the impact of
§ 1983 on municipal treasuries (and the taxpayers who ultimately would shoulder the burden)
and the desire to hold municipalities accountable for their actions in federal court. See George
D. Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism:
A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and I'embaur v. City of Cincinnati, 'The Official
Policy' Cases, 27 B.C. L. REV. 883, 896 (1986); Gerhardt, supra note 47, at 557. In this light, the
Court's rejection of respondeat superior is logical, as a balancing of competing interests, despite
flaws in its legal analysis.
59 Monett, 436 U.S. at 692-93 n.57.
6" See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
61
 Monell, 436 U.S. at 693. Monell's reliance on Congress's rejection of the Sherman Amend-
ment for any insight into the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior is questionable.
The most reasonable interpretation of Congress's rejection of the Sherman Amendment is that
Congress did not intend to hold municipalities vicariously liable for the acts of residents or
citizens who were neither municipal officials nor employees. interestingly, while Monett corrected
Monroe's obvious error in using the Sherman Amendment rejection to determine the meaning
of the word "persons," Monell then made the same mistake by applying the Sherman Amendment
in an equally inapplicable context. Monell's reading of the legislative history of the Ku Klux Act
of 1871 in regard to respondent superior has met with widespread academic criticism. See, e.g.,
Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts,
51 TEMP L.Q. 409, 413 n,15 (1978); Eric M. Hellise, Monell v. Department of Social Services: One
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entirely new requirement that a municipality be held liable when a
local official or employee violates an individual's federal rights only
when the deprivation occurs pursuant to an official policy or a long-
standing custom.''' The Monell Court provided no guidance as to what
constitutes an official policy, other than by making a general comment
that an official policy could be a "policy statement, ordinance, regula-
tion, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's
officers."' Without further explanation, the Court simply noted that
Monell unquestionably involved an official policy, and expressly left the
exploration of the full parameters of municipal liability under § 1983
open for another day." In this manner, the Court embarked on an
arduous journey of balancing the interests of those individuals who
have had their rights violated with the interests of municipalities in
maintaining fiscal integrity.
C. Tuttle Rejects Municipal Policy for Random Acts by Low-Level City
Employees Not Attributable to Municipal Policymakers
The Supreme Court began setting the parameters of municipal
policy in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle.° In Tuttle, an Oklahoma City
Step Forward and a Half Step Back for Municipal Liability Under Section 1983,7 110FSTRA L. RKv,
893, 909-21 (1979); Charles A. Rothfeld, Sedion 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of
Respondent Superior, 46 U, CHI. L. REV. 935, 960-62 (1979); Randall R, Steichen, Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983 for Civil Rights Violations AfierMonell, 64 IowA L. REv. 1032, 1045 -55
(1979).
Despite a shaky logical Rioting and extensive academic criticism, the Supreme Court has not
indicated any interest in reconsidering MonelPs rejection of respcmdeat superior. justice Stevens
is the only justice to have expressed support for overruling this aspect of Monell. See City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 148 n.1 (1988) (Stevens, j., dissenting); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489-90 n.4 (1986) (Stevens, j., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-44 (1985) (Stevens, j., dissenting).
Consequently. any discussion or municipality liability !mist assume as a starting point that respon-
deat superior does not apply.
62 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A municipality, therelbre, will he liable where the "execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly he said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." Id. The requirement of a policy
or custom does not arise out of the language of the Act or even from its legislative history. In
setting forth the policy requirement, the Supreme Court, in effect, created federal cominon law.
See Gerhardt, supra note 47, at 544 & n.20.
65 Monett, 436 U.S. at 690. In contrast to the lack of guidance as to what constitutes an official
policy, the Court defined a custom as a practice "so permanent. and well settled as to constitute
a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). This definition has remained applicable to § 1983 litigation. See, e.g.,
Praprotnilt, 485 U.S. at 127; Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 820 (1989).
64 Monett, 436 U.S. at 694-95. Neither party disputed that an official policy was implicated in
the action. Id. at 660-62 & n.2.
65 971 U.S. 808 (1985). The Supreme Court had previously addressed other issues related to
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police officer who had been on the force for only ten months re-
sponded alone to an all-points bulletin indicating a robbery in progress
at a bar in Oklahoma City. 66 The bulletin resulted from a telephone
call from an anonymous source who described the robber and re-
ported that the robber had a gun." The officer testified that when he
entered the bar, Albert Tuttle, who matched the bulletin description,
walked toward him and that he grabbed Tuttle by the arm and re-
quested that he wait by the bar. 68
 The officer began to question the
barmaid, who testified that she told the officer no robbery had oc-
curred. Tuttle, who had been attempting to break free from the
officer's grip, finally did so and went outside, ignoring the officer's
commands to halt. When the officer followed outside, Tuttle was kneel-
ing down with his hand near his boot. The officer testified that he
believed Tuttle was removing a gun from his boot, and the officer then
shot and killed him. When the boot was later removed, a toy pistol fell
out. 69
Tuttle's estate filed a § 1983 action against the officer and the City
of Oklahoma City, alleging that the officer had deprived Tuttle of his
constitutional rights and that the officer's actions had resulted from a
city policy of inadequate police training. 70 The district court instructed
the jury that an official policy may be inferred from "a single, unusually
excessive use of force" that is "sufficiently out of the ordinary to
warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate training or
supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross negli-
gence' on the part of the officials in charge."7 ' The jury returned a
verdict against the City, which was upheld by the court of appeals. 72
municipal liability tinder § 1983. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
271 (1981) (punitive damages are not available against municipalities under § 1983); Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 US. 622, 657 (1980) (traditional common law immunities may shield
individual defendants, but not municipalities, from liabilities). Although the Court did not
address the question of municipal policy in either of the above cited opinions, these two cases
have come to stand for the proposition that a single act by a city legislature constitutes an act of
official government policy, regardless of whether the legislature had so acted in the past or had
any intention of repeating its action in the future. See Pernbaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 480 (1986) (citing Owen t City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (city council passed
resolution firing plaintiff without a pretermination hearing); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247 (1981) (city council canceled license permitting concert because of dispute over content
of performance)).
66 Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 810-11.
67 1d. at 811.
68 Id
69 Id.
70 Id at 811-12.
71 Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 813.
72 Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir. 1984), reu'd, 471 U.S. 808
(1985).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a single incident
of unconstitutional activity by a low-level police officer does not estab-
lish municipal liability."
The Supreme Court began by reaffirming Monell's rejection of
respondeat superior liability and its imposition of a fault-based analysis
requiring that a municipal policy or custom cause the violation of an
individual's federal right in order to establish municipal liability under
§ 1983.1^ The Supreme Court then attempted to define municipal
policy." The Court held that a policy "generally implies a course of
action consciously chosen from among various alternatives."7" The
Court, however, further held that a municipality may be held liable
only for those policies attributable to a municipal decisionmaker or
policymaker. 77 The Court did not define decisionmaker or policy-
maker, although it rejected the possibility that the police officer in
Tuttle could be either."
D. Pembaur Enunciates the Final Authority Doctrine
The shaping of the present doctrine as to what constitutes a
municipal policy for which a municipality may be held liable began in
73 Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824. The Court refitsed to address whether the evidence supported a
finding that the city had in place a program of inadequate training and that this training was the
policy that led to the deprivation of Tuttle's constitutional rights. Id. at 121. The Court found
that the jury instruction allowed the jury to lind the municipality liable "even in the face of
uncontradicted evidence that the municipality scrutinized each police applicant and met the
highest training standards imaginable.' Id. at 821-22. Consequently, the issue here was not when
a policy of inadequate training may constitute a municipal policy, but when a single action taken
by a single police officer may do so.
74 Id. at 817-20.
75 Id, at 820-24.
74 1d. at 823.
77
	 at 821, 823.
78 Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821, 824. The Court also began to distinguish between constitutional
and unconstitutional policies and the standard by which municipal liability attaches to each:
Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose
liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused
by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy may be attributed to
a municipal policymaker.
Id. at 823-24. Nevertheless,
where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof
than a single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite
fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the 'policy'
and the constitutional deprivation.
Id. at 824 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court ultimately decided that a municipality tnay
be held liable tinder § 1983 when a constitutional policy is applied in an unconstitutional manner
only in a limited number of "failure to train' cases. See City of Canton v, Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
387 (1989). Liability attaches only where the failure to train amounts to conscious indifference
to the rights of people with whom the police come into contact. Id. at 388. Specifically, plaintiff
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Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati.'`' Pembaur involved two Hamilton County,
Ohio, deputy sheriffs who attempted to serve two capiases on a doctor's
employees!'" The doctor refused them entrance to his office even after
several Cincinnati police officers arrived and advised him to allow the
deputy sheriffs' entrance. 8 ' After conferring with the county prosecu-
tor, an assistant county prosecutor instructed the deputy sheriffs to
enter and get the witnesses, which the sheriffs attempted to do." The
Cincinnati police officers chopped down the door to the clinic to allow
the deputy sheriff's entrance." The deputy sheriffs then searched the
clinic, without locating the individuals for whom the capiases were
issued." The doctor subsequently brought a § 1983 suit against the
City, the County and various individual defendants, alleging that the
search of his office had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether, and in what circumstances, a single decision or
decisions related to one single incident, may constitute official munici-
pal policy sufficient to establish municipal liability under § 1983. 8"
In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court
found that the deputy sheriffs were . acting pursuant to an official
government policy when they forced their way into the doctor's office
because their actions were authorized by the county prosecutor, a
municipal policymaker. 87 Pembaur tantalizingly opened the door to
municipal liability by expanding Tuttle's definition of policy. The Court
in Tuttle defined a policy as a deliberate choice to follow a course of
action made from among various alternatives. 88 In Pembaur, Justice
Brennan explained that an official policy encompasses not only formal,
written rules, but also unwritten plans of action." A policy may also
must prove that the municipality is deliberately indifferent to the need for more or different
training. Id. at 390 & n.10. For a discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court thinking on this
subject, see Anthony I). Schroeder, City of Canton v. Harris: The Deliberate Indifference Standard
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Failure to Train Cases, 22 U. Tut.. L. REV. 107 (1990).
79 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
8° Id at 472.
81 1d
82 Id.
39 Id.
" Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 473-74.
85 Id. at 473-74. The § 198 3 violation was premised upon the Fourth Amendment prohibiting
the police from searching an individual's home or business without a search warrant to execute
an arrest warrant for a third person, a proposition upheld in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204 (1981). See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 474.
8r'
	 475 U.S. at 477.
87 Id. at 484-85.
88 Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823.
89 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-81.
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exist if an action is taken once or repeatedly, as a single decision is
enough to constitute an official policy, if adopted by the appropriate
policymaker."" Moreover, a course of action established by appropriate
decisionmakers can constitute an official policy even if it is tailored to
a specific situation and not intended to control decisions in subsequent
circumstances.•' Therefore, it follows that almost all actions taken by a
municipality could be considered a policy.
While expanding what constitutes a policy, Pembaur strikes at the
heart of municipal liability by narrowing who may enact an official
policy for which the municipality may be liable. The only decisions that
may subject a municipality to liability are those decisions made by
someone possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with
respect to the action ordered, or the subject matter in question. 92 The
scope of an individual's authority at state law, not which branch of
government or what office the official holds, provides the initial step
for determining whether a policymaker has final authority." Legislative
enactments may grant final authority directly, or officials who possess
final authority may delegate such authority. 94 Because policymaking
authority may be widely dispersed throughout the modern municipal-
ity, the jury may have to determine whether an individual official acted
as a policymaker in any given situation."
Pembaur does not explain how to distinguish policymaking author-
ity as defined by state and local law from policymaking authority as it
is practiced through de facto delegation within a locality. A broad
reading of delegation would presume policymaking authority to be
delegated from the official holder of the authority to the official who
actually implements policy. Pembaur, however, distinguishes the delega-
tion of policymaking authority from the delegation of discretion to
implement policies articulated by the policymaker." If the official is
merely implementing or acting pursuant to an official policy, then that
exercise of discretionary functions does not, without more, constitute
a policy."' The crucial distinction is that final policymaking authority
90 1d. at 481.
91 Id.
52 Id.
93 Id. at 483.
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 483 & n.12.
97 1d. In a lbotnote, the Court illustrates the distinction;
This fOr example, the County Sheriff may have discretion to hire and fire employ-
ees without also being the county official responsible for establishing county em-
ployment policy. If this were the case, the Sheriff's decisions respecting employment
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is not synonymous with final authority to act. Pembaur did not, however,
explain how to determine when someone is a policymaker acting
pursuant to a delegation of authority and when someone is a mere
decisionmaker exercising discretion in implementing a policy created
elsewhere.
E. Praprotnik Relies on State Law to Determine Final Authority
Further clarification of municipal policy came in City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik. 98 James Praprotnik, an architect employed by the City of
St. Louis for fifteen years, had attained a mid-level management posi-
tion in the St. Louis Community Development Agency ("CDA" ). 99
 The
director of the CDA required that the agency's professionals, including
its architects, obtain prior approval before accepting outside work.'°°
Praprotnik objected to and refused to follow the requirement. As a
consequence of accepting outside work without approval, he received
a fifteen-day suspension which the St. Louis Civil Service Commission
("Commission") overturned upon appeal. 101
 Praprotnik's job perform-
ance evaluations reflected his supervisors' unhappiness with the Com-
mission's decision and with Praprotnik's actions in appealing the sus-
pension. 1 °2
 Although the CDA retained Praprotnik during a period of
layoffs, it eventually transferred him to a new position with primarily
clerical responsibilities, and finally terminated him when the CDA
eliminated his new position, allegedly for budgetary reasons.'"
Praprotnik appealed each of these decisions, including his unfavorable
job performance evaluations, to the Commission, which had authority
to affirm or overturn employment decisions made by the director of
the CDA. The Commission awarded him partial relief from his negative
would not give rise to municipal liability, although similar decisions with respect to
law enforcement practices, over which the Sheriff is the official policymaker, would
give rise to municipal liability. Instead, if county employment policy was set by the
Board of County Commissioners, only that body's decisions would provide a basis
for county liability. This would be true even if the Board left the Sheriff discretion
to hire and fire employees and the Sheriff exercised that discretion in an uncon-
stitutional manner; the decision to act unlawfully would not be a decision of the
Board. However, if the Board delegated its power to establish final employment
policy to the Sheriff, the Sheriffs decisions would represent county policy and could
give rise to municipal liability.
Id. at 483 n.12 (emphasis in original).
98 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
99 Id. at 114.
199 Id.
wt Id. at 115. The commission also awarded Praprotnik back pay. Id.
02 Id
108
 Praprolnik, 485 U.S. at 115-16.
July 1993]	 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY	 709
job evaluations, but refused to address the transfer because that in itself
did not involve a pay decrease and therefore was not an adverse
employment decision.w4 The Commission also did not review his ter-
mination because by that time Praprotnik had filed a § 1983 action in
federal court alleging that his First Amendment rights had been vio-
lated by actions taken in retaliation for his appeal of the fifteen-day
suspension for violation of the CDA policy on outside work.'° 5 At trial,
the jury found the municipality liable, implicitly determining that the
actions taken by Praprotnik's supervisor and by the heads of the CDA
constituted a municipal policy. 10" Both the district court and the court
of appeals upheld that verdict.' 67
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Praprotnik's rights had
not been violated pursuant to an official policy of the City of St.
Louis.'" The plurality opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, and
adopted by a majority of the Court the following year in Jell v. Dallas
Independent School District," broadly framed the issue and established
"the proper legal standard for determining when isolated decisions by
municipal officials or employees may expose the municipality itself to
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.""° Thus, rather than determining who
held final authority to act pursuant to St. Louis' personnel policy in
Praprotnik's transfer or firing, the Court examined where final policy-
making authority lies within the St. Louis infrastructure. Relying upon
Pembaur's reference to state law as a key source for determining final
authority, the Praprotnik plurality transformed that reference into a
rule of determination, stating that only state law may provide the
answer to where policymaking authority lies."
The Praprotnik Court held that, as a matter of law, the determi-
104 id.
1"5 Id. at 1 16.
Id. at 117.
tar Id.
"Praprotniit, 485 U.S, at 131-32.
109 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). Jett addressed whether under 42 U.S.C, § 1981, a municipality
may be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 705. The Jett Court held that
respondeat superior is not available under § 1981 because § 1983 provides the exclusive damages
remedy for actions against state officials brought pursuant to § 1981: Id. at 736-38. Consequently,
the Supreme Court remanded for a determination of whether a municipal policy was implicated.
Id. at 738. For guidance on remand, the Court briefly discussed how to determine whether an
official possesses authority to set policy, and the Court adopted the standard, if not explicitly the
rationale, found in Praprotnik's plurality opinion. Id. at 735-38. For a discussion of felt s implica-
tions for whether Justice O'Connor's plurality in Praprolnik has been transformed into a majority
opinion, with a caution not to read fen too broadly, see note 6, supra.
11 ° Praprolnik, 485 U.S. at 114.
"I Id. at 124-25.
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nation of where state law places final authority for policymaking is not
a question of fact for a jury." 2
 Indeed, the Supreme Court expressed
confidence "that state law (which may include valid local ordinances
and regulations) will always direct a court to some official or body that
has the responsibility for making , law or setting policy in any given area
of local government's business.""s By removing from the jury the
inquiry into where actual authority is held and replacing it with a legal
question for the court, the Court elevates legal formalism to constitu-
tional practice. Applying local law to Praprotnik's facts, the Supreme
Court reversed, finding that only the Commission was authorized by
law to create policy in the employment area and that the Commission
had not delegated its authority to the CDA." 4 Consequently, no em-
ployment actions taken by any CDA official, including its Director,
could, in and of itself, expose the City of St. Louis to § 1983 liability." 5
Recognizing that special problems can arise when plaintiffs allege
that policymakers identified by state law delegated final authority, the
Praprotnik plurality offered two principles to guide lower courts in
determining where policymaking authority lies." 6
 First, the Court em-
braced the notion that plaintiffs have the opportunity to prove that
widespread common practices constitute "customs."" 7 Second, the
Court noted the distinction between final decisions and final policy
decisions." 8
 The Court explained that courts should not treat a subor-
dinate official as holding final policymaking authority when the mu-
nicipality's policymakers retain the right to review that official's deci-
"5 Id. at 126.
115 1d. at 125.
114 Id. at 129.
15
 See id. at 130. The Court did not make a holding particular to the facts in the case
presented, but indicated that the court of appeals on remand could hear further arguments
consistent with the opinion. See id. at 131-32.
1 L6 Nap-mina, 485 U.S. at 126-27. Among the special problems created by delegation is the
possibility that lawful policymakers could delegate their authority solely to insulate themselves
from § 1983 liability. The Court noted that such manipulation would defeat the purposes of
§ 1983. Id. at 126.
117 Id. at 127 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,167-68 (1970)).
118 Id. at 127. The court stated that "when an official's discretionary decisions are constrained
by policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departures
from them, are the act of the municipality." Id. at 127.
19 1d. "[W] hen a subordinate's decision is subject to review by the municipality's authorized
policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official's decision for conformance
with their policies." Id. (emphasis in original). Praprotnik does not address whether policymaking
authority is delegated when the policymaker does not retain the authority to review decisions
taken by those officials nut specifically authorized by local law to set policy. The Circuits have
split on this issue. See infra notes 138-70 and accompanying text.
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sions." 9 Consequently, unless a custom is proven,' 2" the conduct gen-
erally will not constitute a policy unless "the authorized policymakers
approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it." 12 '
In Praprotnik, although the Commission retained the right to
review personnel decisions of the CDA's Director, it chose not to
exercise that right when it declined to hear Praprotnik's appeal of his
transfer and termination. 122 Nevertheless, the Court found that the
record did not establish that the adverse job actions against Praprotnik
were performed pursuant to an official policy.I 23 In effect, then, the
Court allowed St. Louis's policymakers, the Commission, to insulate
the municipality from liability by retaining the right to review but not
exercising that right.
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, attacked the plurality's strict
reliance on state law and narrow view of delegation as unrealistic and
warned that municipalities could use the Court's narrow rule to insu-
late themselves from liability for most official actions. 12' Viewing state
law as the starting point rather than the sole source of policymaking
authority, justice Brennan would have the fact finder determine where
actual authority resides.' 26 Justice Brennan explained that when state
law is unclear, or when real and apparent authority diverge, it is
necessary to determine where final authority lies by looking at the
facts.' 26 Without such an evaluation of the facts, Justice Brennan main-
tained, municipalities could avoid § 1983 liability by placing legal
authority in one body and actual authority in another. 127 Thus, accord-
ing to Justice Brennaii, the plurality's construction of § 1983 creates a
"gaping hole" through which many valid claims of civil rights depriva-
dons may fall, thereby insulating municipalities from § 1983 liability. 128
120 See Praprolrtik, 485 U.S. at 130. The Court indicates that although general delegations of
discretionary decision making do not constitute delegation of policymaking authority, "it would
be a different matter if a series of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a 'custom or
usage' of which the supervisor must have been aware." Id.
121 1d. at 127.
122 See id. at 116,129.
I" See id. at 129.
12a
	 at 132 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan notes that in
Pembaur; the Court had relied on testimony that the county sheriff's office routinely forwarded
questions to the county prosecutor in finding that statements by the county prosecutor constituted
a municipal policy. Id. See also Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469,485 (1986). liven though state law did not
place such authority in the prosecutor's office, the Court found that an official policy was
implicated.
126 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127 1d. at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1281d.
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Although the plurality had addressed the special problems dele-
gation authority creates, 129 Justice Brennan maintained that the plural-
ity's suggested guidelines were inadequate to resolve the issues that
would inevitably arise due to an inflexible adherence to state statutory
law.'" Justice Brennan correctly points out that Congress did not in-
tend the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to encompass only egregious viola-
tions of constitutional rights as the plurality's opinion seems to sug-
gest.''' Further, Congress did not intend it to apply only after violations
occur so often that they are labeled permanent and well settled and
therefore constitute a custom.'" From Justice Brennan's criticism of
the plurality's opinion, it appears that the plurality's vision of munici-
pal policy allows municipalities to avoid § 1983 liability in all but the
most extreme cases simply by insulating their policymakers from day-
to-day decision making.
In sum, the Supreme Court has adopted a formalistic vision of
municipal liability under § 1983. Municipal liability only attaches when
a person's federal rights are violated by a municipal official or em-
ployee acting pursuant to an official municipal policy or a well-settled
municipal custom, and the policy or custom caused the violation of
the federal rights. The touchstone of municipal liability, and the focus
of this Article, is the official policy requirement. Although the Supreme
Court has broadly interpreted a policy to be a deliberate choice to take
some course of action, whether written or unwritten, regardless of
whether intended to meet a particular situation or to control future
decisions," the Court has restricted the policies that are attributable
to the municipality by restricting which officials may adopt policies that
create liability under § 1983.''4 Specifically, under the Supreme Court's
current interpretation of § 1983, municipalities are liable only for
those policies adopted by officials with final authority to enact policy
in that given area.'" Furthermore, courts must rely solely on state and
/ 29 Id. at 126-27 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
"13 Id. at 144 & n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring).
131
 Praprolnik, 485 U.S. at 144 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan quotes from
the plurality's opinion for the proposition that "egregious attempts by local governments to
insulate themselves from liability" may be thwarted by the "custom" doctrine, which allows liability
for widespread practices that are permanent and well-settled, even if those practices do not
amount to a policy. Id. See also id. at 127 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
152 See id. at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring).
15t Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985).
"4 See generally Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 121-23 (who is a final policymaker).
"5 1d. at 124-25.
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local law to determine which municipal officials are vested with final
policymaking authority.' 36
II. LOWER COURTS SPLIT ON HOW To APPLY PRAPROTNIK
After Praprotnik, Justice Brennan's prophecy of a "gaping hole"'"
in § 1983 liability has only partially materialized. While certain courts
have been content to apply Praprotnik mechanically, and in some
instances even further narrow its restrictive view of municipal liability,
other courts have refused to follow Praprotnik to this end, searching
for creative ways to circumvent Praprotnik's potentially harsh result.
The battle over Praprotnik and the future of municipal liability has
taken place largely over the questions of when a delegation of authority
to act may be transformed into a delegation of policymaking authority
and whether there are certain municipal officials (i.e., elected officials)
who should be treated as per se policymakers.
A. Delegated Policymaking Authority
The Supreme Court has not yet directly settled the issue of
whether municipalities may convert an ordinary decisionmaker into a
policymaker by delegating unreviewable authority to act to the deci-
sionmaker. The Court in Praprotnik indicated that there is no delega-
tion of policymaking authority when an official's discretionary deci-
sions are constrained by policies not of that official's making or when
those decisions are subject to review by other officials.' 38 Unanswered
is whether delegation of policymaking authority occurs when the
official with delegated power is constrained only in name, not in fact,
by policies made by another, because there is no right to review that
official's discretionary decisions. Some courts have found that a com-
plete delegation of authority to act may transform a municipal official
into a policymaker. 139 Other courts consider the retention of power to
1911
137 Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring).
M M. at 127, 130.
159 Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 630-31 (10th Cir. 1992) (school district not liable under § 1983
for employment decision by school principal because district school board's retention of the
authority to review principal's decisions amounted to an incomplete delegation of authority);
Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 714-15 (11th Cir. 1992) (city liable under § 1983
for employment decision by city manager who is a policymaker due to statute prohibiting review
of such decisions by city commission); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d
Cir. 1990) (city not liable under § 1983 for actions by subordinates of police commissioner,
because they were not policymakers due to the commissioner's ultimate control); Mandel v. Doe,
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review irrelevant to the determination of whether a delegation of
policymaking authority has occurred and, instead, examine only the
type of authority delegated—policymaking or authority to act:" The
opposing positions are best viewed by comparing the Seventh Circuit's
treatment of the issue in Auriemma v. Rice"' with that of the Eighth
Circuit in Williams v. Bullet: 142
In Auriemma, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a § 1983 action
against a municipality, which alleged grievous racial and political dis-
crimination, finding that althciugh the decisions that deprived the
individuals of their federal rights were made by executive officials,
policymaking authority was vested by state law in the legislative
branch: 43 Auriemma is striking because the court reached this result
even though the legislature did not have the power to review the
decisions of the executive branch.'" When Fred Rice became Superin-
tendent of the Chicago Police Department, he reshuffled the senior
888 F.2d 783, 794 (11th Cir. 1989) (city not liable under § 1983 for action of physician's assistant
who is policymaker because he functions with no review except to the extent he requests review);
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 829 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 924 (1990) (city liable
under § 1983 for acts of police chief because of complete delegation of policymaking authority
to bins); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 819 (10th Cir. 1989) (county liable under § 1983 for
employment decision by sheriff where no review of decision available, but not subject to such
liability fur sheriff's harassment of plaintiff which extended beyond his policymaking authority);
Williams v. Butler, 863 E2d 1398, 1402-03 (8th Cir. 1988) (en'banc) (plurality opinion), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989) (city liable under § 1983 for employment decision by municipal judge
who is policymaker due to absolute delegation and lack of avenues for review of such decision);
Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1989) (county liable under § 1983 for employ-
ment decision by sheriff, who is a policymaker because he had unreviewable authority to make
such (Iecisions).
141 SeeAuriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400-01 (7th Cir, 1992) (city not liable under § 1983
for political and racially discriminatory employment practices of sheriff who had unreviewable
authority to make such decisions, where city ordinances banned such discrimination); Johnson
v, Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (6th Cir. 1990) (county not liable under § 1983 for
medical decisions by county jailer even though he has complete "custody, rule and charge" of
the jail and all persons in it and unreviewable authority to make decisions governing medical
care for prisoners, where statute provided that local legislature was vested with authority to enact
ordinances and issue regulations in regard to medical care at the jail, even through relevant
ordinances or regulations had never been adopted); Crowley v. Prince George's County, 890 F.2d
683, 685-86 (4th Cir. 1989) (county not liable under § 1983 for police chiefs retaliatory termi-
nation of employee even though chief possessed total and unreviewable authority to make
personnel decisions, where county charter provided that personnel decisions would be based on
merit and fitness and banned discriminatory personnel actions, and when county charter pro-
vided that city council shall provide by law for a personnel system).
141 957 E2d at 397.
142 863 F.2cl at 1398.
143 Auriemma, 957 E2d at 401.
141 1d. The Seventh Circuit defined executive authority as authority to act or authority to
implement policy. Id. at 399. Legislative authority, on the other hand, is authority to set policy.
Id.
July 1993)	 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY	 715
ranks of the department by promoting thirteen African-American of-
ficers, nine white officers, and three Hispanic officers, by demoting no
African-American officers, twenty-five white officers and one Hispanic
officer, and by eliminating six jobs." At the time, Rice justified this
major reorganization solely by stating that the newly promoted officers
made him feel more "comfortable." Later, he added that he wanted
officers who accepted his management style." 7 A number of the de-
moted officers sued the City of Chicago 148 under § 1983, alleging that
Rice demoted them because of their race and politics, and that Rice's
actions as Superintendent of Police constituted a policy.""
The Seventh Circuit limited its inquiry to determining who had
final authority under state and local law to set employment policy for
the City of Chicago.'" The Chicago City Council, as the municipal
legislature, had determined the City's relevant employment policy
when it passed local ordinances to prohibit racial and political discrimi-
nation. 151 In addition, Chicago was under an injunction, pursuant to a
consent decree, barring political considerations for certain jobs, in-
cluding those held by plaintiffs.' 52 As a result, the Seventh Circuit held
that the Superintendent did not possess final policymaking authority
in this area because he did not have the authority to violate the local
ordinances or the injunction.'" The Police Superintendent, although
possessing sole authority over personnel decisions within the police
department, still exercised only executive authority to act, as he was
statutorily required to manage the department consistent with city
ordinances, state laws, and police board regulations.'" The statutory
absence of any mechanism for the City Council to review the personnel
actions taken by the Superintendent of Police did not transform him
into a policymaker.' 55 The Seventh Circuit therefore allowed the City
145 Id. at 398.
1461d.
147 Id.
1411 The plaintiffs also sued Rice in his individual capacity. That suit was separated and the
question of Rice's individual liability was addressed in Aurienuna v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449 (7th Cir.
1990) (en bane), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 2796 (1991).
149 Auriernma, 957 F.2d at 398. Moreover, the complaint alleged that the Mayor of Chicago
approved the personnel changes, and that the mayor's ratification constituted a policy. Id. at
399-400. See also Aurienuna v. City of Chicago, 747 F. Stipp. 465,466-68 (N.D. III. 1990), aff'd,
957 F.2d 397 (7111 Cir. 1992), for a biller statement of facts alleged in the complaint.
15° Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 399,
/51 Id.
152 a
155 1d. al 401.
154 Id.
' 55 See. Autiemma, 957 F.2d at 399-400.
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of Chicago to avoid § 1983 liability by distinguishing executive officials
with total and unreviewable authority to act and to make a final deci-
sion from legislative officials designated by state and local law as poli-
cymakers with the authority to adopt rules for the conduct of govern-
ment. 156
The treatment of Praprotnik and the municipal policymaker doc-
trine in Auriemma stand in stark contrast to the Eighth Circuit's analysis
of the same issues in Williams v. Butlerim In Williams, the Eighth Circuit
found that where an official designated by state law to make policy did
not retain authority to review decisions, the municipal official with
delegated authority to act became a policymaker within the guidelines
of Praprotnik.' 58 Debbie Williams, a municipal court clerk, witnessed
William Butler, an elected municipal judge for the City of Little Rock
traffic court, deliberately destroy traffic tickets.' 59 Williams notified the
police of Butler's actions, and, when Butler learned of her action, he
fired her. 16° Williams then filed a § 1983 action alleging that her First
Amendment rights had been violated. 16 '
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether it could hold
the city liable under § 1983 for a municipal judge's unconstitutional
discharge of a court clerk.' 62 The court began its analysis by articulating
the "very fine" difference between a delegation of policymaking
authority and a mere delegation of authority to act.' 63 According to the
court, this difference depends upon how much authority the delegat-
156 Id. at 401.
157 863 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906
(1989).
159 1d. at 1402. The Eighth Circuit valiantly maintained this position through two remands
ordered by the Supreme Court. See id. at 1399. initially, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the § 1983
liability established by a jury verdict in the District Court. Williams v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431, 434
(8th Cir. 1984). On rehearing, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision by an
equally divided court in Williams v. Butler, 762 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The Supreme
Court granted the City's petition for certiorari and immediately vacated the judgment of the en
bane court and remanded the case to be decided in light of Pembaur, 475 U.S. 1105 (1986). On
remand the Eighth Circuit once again affirmed the District Court. Williams v. Butler, 802 F.2d
296, 302 (8th Cir. 1986) (7-5 decision) (en banc) (municipal judge exercised final policymaking
authority rather than simply discretion to hire and fire). Again the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded, this time with directions to reconsider in light of Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 931 (1988). On
remand, the Eighth Circuit again affirmed the District Court's holding. 863 F.2d 1398, 1403 (8th
Cir. 1988). This time, the Supreme Court denied the City's petition for certiorari. 492 U.S. 906
(1989).
159 Williams, 863 F.2d at 1399.
15° Id.
EGI Id.
162 1d. at 1403.
165 Id. at 1402.
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ing policymaker retains.' The court stated that Praprotnik's message
is that municipal liability does not result from incomplete delegations
of authority, but may result from an absolute delegation) 66
The Court then explained why Butler clearly enjoyed an absolute
delegation of authority which resulted in municipal liability under
§ 1983. He had been given "carte blanche authority" to hire and fire his
clerks, and the clerks had no internal appellate procedures available
to challenge adverse employment decisions.' 66 The court emphasized
that, as a result of the broad delegation in employment matters within
his court, no other policymaker constrained Butler's actions. 167 The
court noted that in this litigation, the City originally maintained that
Butler had sole control of employment decisions in the municipal
court.' 68 The court concluded that Butler's final policymaking author-
ity concerning employment decisions in his court properly exposed
the City to liability under § 1983) 69
The Supreme Court has yet to address the irreconcilable differ-
ences between Auriemma and Williams. In Praprotnik, the designated
policymaker retained the power to review the decisions of the nonpoli-
cymakers. 17° The Supreme Court did not decide, however, whether the
absence of the right to review necessarily creates a policymaker. The
Supreme Court may find the right to review that existed in Praprotnik
important in determining whether policymaking authority has been
delegated and thus eventually support the view that an absence of the
right to review creates a policymaker, as exemplified by Williams. Con-
versely, the Supreme Court may treat the power to review as irrelevant,
164 Williams, 863 F.2(1 at 1902.
165 /d.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
111• Williams, 863 F.2d at 1403.
1 " Praprainik appears to stand for the proposition that if a policymaker retains the right to
review, but does not exercise that right, policymaking authority has not been delegated. See
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); see also Williams, 863 F.2d at 1402 (incomplete delegation
does not give rise to liability under § 1983). This result is necessary if the Court is serious about.
preventing principles of respondeat superior from slipping into the analysis through the hack
door. Municipal policymakers cannot in fact review every decision by every municipal employee.
If that were to occur, municipal government would grind to a halt. On the other hand, there is
a risk that municipal policymakers may try to absolve the municipality of liability by refusing to
review controversial decisions. One option here is to heed the common sense warning of one
court, which observed that a failure to review will not always be countenanced: municipal
policymakers may not purposely refuse to exercise their right to review an order to insulate
themselves from liability. See Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a board of supervisors' summary approval proceedings constituted reckless disre-
gard of constitutional rights).
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restricting the analysis solely to where state law explicitly places policy-
making authority, the approach exemplified by Auriemma.
B. Per Se Policymakers
Federal law is also unsettled as to whether there are certain elected
officials who, by virtue of their office, are per se policymakers.' 71 A strict
interpretation of Praprotnik and Pembaur has led several courts to
conclude that there are no per se policymakers. 172
 These courts note
that Pembaur and Praprolnik seem to caution that certain officials may
be policymakers in one area but not in another, and therefore that the
court must determine whether the official possesses policymaking
authority in the area in question.'" The key question, therefore, is not
what office the official holds or how much power an official possesses,
but whether that official possesses policymaking authority in the area
in question. 174 If local law demonstrates that an elected official, regard-
less of the office, does not in fact possess policymaking authority in an
171
 Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, it did surface briefly
in Praprotnik. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, attempted to portray Praprolnik as present-
ing the question whether the City of St. Louis could he held liable for actions taken by its mayor,
claiming that the record demonstrated that "perhaps the mayor" had been involved in the
decisionmaking. 485 U.S. at 158-61 (Stevens,]., dissenting). Justice Stevens would have imposed
liability because the mayor is a "high official" and actions by high officials are a "kind of
`statement'" about how similar decisions will be carried out, in contrast to actions by lower officials
which "lack the potential of controlling governmental decisionmaking" and are not "perceived
as the actions of the city itself." Id. at 171. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, however, did not
include any reference in its facts to the mayor's involvement in the decisionmaking, and thus did
not address the issue of elected officials. The plurality opinion did reject Justice Stevens's
distinction between high and low officials as a universal basis for determining § 1983 liability as
"too imprecise" and nothing more than an attempt to apply respondeat superior through the
hack door. Id. at 125 n.2. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, stated that the record did not
support the conclusion that the mayor had been involved, and thus did not address whether
there are officials for whose actions liability should attach simply because of the nature of their
office. Id. at 142 n.2 (Brennan, J„ concurring).
172 See Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1992) (mayor is not a policymaker in
personnel area, despite being an elected official, where neither state nor local law specifically
vests mayor with policymaking authority in personnel area); Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo,
929 F.2d 633, 637-38, reh'g denied., 942 F.2d 798 (11th Cir. 1991) (mayor not a policymaker in
area of land planning and zoning, despite being elected official, where mayor's veto of legislative
ordinances and resolutions in land planning and zoning could be overridden by the city council);
Johnson v. Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (6th Cir. 1990) (elected county jailer not a
policymaker because local law did not vest jailer specifically with authority to set medical policy
for jail); Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1339-41 (5th Cir. 1989) (mayor not a
policymaker in personnel area because mayor's personnel decisions are appealable to the city
council).
173 See cases cited supra note 172. See also Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at
483 n.12,
171
 Worsham, 881 F.2d at 1340.
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area, then that official is not a policymaker when taking actions in that
area.' 75
A strict interpretation of Praprotnik has not been universal. Some
courts have deemed elected officials to be per se policymakers by virtue
of the office they hold rather than the specific authority vested in
them. 17" Elected officials often hold "virtually absolute sway over the
particular tasks or areas of responsibility" and therefore often are the
final authority of municipal power, if not the statutory policymaking
authority.'" As the ultimate repositories of power in a municipality,
elected officials actions, however authorized, should be viewed as
official municipal policies.
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether certain officials,
by the nature of their office, may be properly labeled policymakers
without reference to any express delegation of policymaking authority.
Praprotnik's reliance on state law and its directive to examine whether
policymaking authority has been vested in any given area, while not
encompassing this result, does not preclude a finding that certain
officials should be viewed as having been vested with policymaking
authority for all of their actions.
III. THE UNDERMINING OF § 1983 BY A FORMALISTIC VISION OF
MUNICIPAL POLICYMAKERS
As discussed in Section I of this Article, the Supreme Court has
adopted a formalistic vision of who are municipal policymakers by
identifying policymakers based solely on where state and local law
expressly place policymaking authority. This approach undermines
§ 1983's purpose of providing a federal remedy to ensure that local
175 See, e,g., Worsham, 881 F.2d at 1340 (mayor's decisions appealable to city council); Starrett
v. Wadlq, 876 F.2d 808, 819 (10th Cir. 1989) (sheriff's actions exposed county to § 1983 liability
for employment decision but not harassment),
176 See Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1207-09 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Blackburn
v. Snow, 771 E2d 556, 571 (1st Cir. 1985) (elected county sheriff)) (county attorney may be the
type of elected county official whose policy decisions automatically constitute county policy);
Crane v. 'Texas, 759 F.2d 412,428-30 (5th Cir.), affil in part and rev'd in part, 766 F.2d 193 (per
curium), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985) (district attorney). In Blackburn, although the First
Circuit hail found that Massachusetts law expressly placed policymaking authority in the elected
county sheriff', the court also noted that "the Sheriff was the county official who was elected by
the County's voters to act for them and to exercise the powers created by state law. Accordingly,
the Sheriff's strip search policy was Plymouth County's policy." 771 F.2d at 571 (emphasis in
original). In Crane, the Fifth Circuit held that, "because the ultimate authority for determining
County capias procedures reposed in the District Attorney, an elected County official, his deci-
sions in that regard must be considered official policy attributable to the County." 759 F.2d at
430.
177 Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980).
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government officials do not violate federal rights. The Court's reliance
on state and local law allows municipalities to escape liability for the
actions taken by those officials exercising de facto policymaking
authority, despite the absence of an express authorization to do so in
the law. The failure to identify de facto policymaking authority and the
municipalities' corresponding ability to insulate themselves from
§ 1983 liability thwart the remedial purposes of § 1983.
A. Congress Enacted § 1983 to Eliminate Unequal Enforcement of
Federal Law
Adopted in the face of widespread violence by the Ku Klux Klan,
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 addressed the inability or unwillingness on
the part of local officials to stop the violence and protect the African-
Americans upon whom the Klan was perpetrating its violence. Con-
gress feared that local governments were either unable or unwilling to
enforce the law on an equal basis, and thus, that minorities were being
denied the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the recently
enacted Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a result, Con-
gress enacted § 1983 (Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871) to
create a federal remedy for those persons whose rights had been
violated by officials acting under color of state law. The primary pur-
pose of § 1983 is to allow federal courts to prevent local governments
from determining when and which federal laws will be enforced. Sec-
tion 1983 accomplishes this goal by compensating the victims of official
abuses and deterring municipalities from future abuses. Section 1983,
however, creates municipal liability only when the municipality caused
the deprivation of federal rights. Congress therefore created a fault-
based system of liability rather than one that extended unlimited or
vicarious liability to municipalities. As a result, the Supreme Court has
soundly rejected the application of respondeat superior. Given that a
municipality can only act through its agents (its officials and employ-
ees), once the Supreme Court rejected respondeat superior, the press-
ing question became for which actions by which officials is the munici-
pality liable.
B. Rigid Reliance on Formalistic Definition of Policymaker Subverts
§ 1983's Goals
The Supreme Court answered the question as to when a munici-
pality may be held at fault by creating the requirement that the mu-
nicipal official or employee is acting pursuant to a municipal policy.'m
1714 A municipality may also be held liable for a custom, which is a practice which is "perma-
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A municipal policy may only be created by the actions of those officials
who have final authority over policymaking in any given area. Defined
by reference to where local law places policymaking authority, final
authority is a question to be determined by the court rather than by
the jury. 179 Where policymaking authority reposes, therefore, is not
resolved by determining who had the final authority to take the actions
alleged to have deprived a person of his or her federal rights, but
instead by who had the final authority to set general policy in that area.
If the official with the authority to set the policy is not the official who
took the actions alleged to have caused the deprivation of rights, then
the actions were not taken pursuant to a municipal policy and the
municipality is not liable under § 1983.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a municipal official who
possesses final policymaking authority may delegate that authority to
another official and thus create a policymaker not expressly identified
by local law. Where this delegation is done formally, it is easy to identify
where final authority rests. The difficulties arise where there are infor-
mal or implied delegations of policymaking authority. The Supreme
Court has narrowly construed these delegations of authority and has
admonished trial courts not to confuse a delegation of policymaking
authority with a delegation of decisionmaking authority to act. In other
words, an official may have been delegated final authority to act in any
given situation without having been given final authority to set policy
in that area. If an official's decisions are constrained in any way by a
policy not of that official's making, then the official may be exercising
a discretionary authority to act but is not a policymaker. For the
decisions of that official to become official municipal policy, the
authorized policymakers must ratify the decision by approving not only
the decision but its basis.
The application of these principles has resulted in bizarre results
where courts have followed a rigid reliance on the placement of poli-
cymaking authority in the law and have refused to entertain any pos-
sibility of an informal delegation of policymaking authority. In effect,
the "gaping hole" prophesied by Justice Brennan has materialized,
rent and well settled." Mond!, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). Nevertheless, this still leaves wide gaps in municipal liability. A
custom would not apply to single unconstitutional actions taken and not intended to be repeated
in the future, or which were tailored to specific situations. Nor would a custom apply to the first
actions taken which would eventually become a custom but which, initially, could not be viewed
as such.
179 Whether final policymaking authority has been delegated, however, may he a question for
the jury, See Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 829 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 996 U.S. 924 (1990)
(court upheld jury's decision that police chief was policymaker). •
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and, as a result, § 1983 liability has been denied in situations crying
out for a federal remedy. For example, no municipal liability has been
found where a mayor and a police chief were alleged to have practiced
a pattern of intentional racial discrimination against twenty-five senior
police officers, because neither the mayor nor the police chief were
considered policymakers.'"" Instead, the local city council was viewed
as the policymaking authority for the city in the area of employment
discrimination because the council had passed an ordinance blanketly
banning racial discrimination. Consequently, in Auriemma v. Rice, the
Seventh Circuit held that although the mayor and the police chief
possessed final authority to make personnel actions and the council
had no authority to review those actions, and even though the mayor
is an elected official, the boilerplate anti-discrimination ordinance
prevented the city from being from being held liable for the discrimi-
natory actions taken. 18 '
Lower courts have also refused to find informal delegations of
policymaking authority even where the policymaker as identified by
state law has failed to articulate any policy to govern the actions taken
by the decisionmakers and has no authority to review actions taken by
the decisionmakers.' 82
 For example, in Johnson v. Hardin County, the
Sixth Circuit held that a county jailer, an elected official with total
authority over all persons in the custody of the jail, is not a policymaker
when taking actions regarding the medical treatment of prisoners.
Instead, the court found that the local legislature was the policymaker
because it had the power to enact ordinances and issue regulations
regarding the county jail. The court found no informal delegation of
the legislature's policymaking authority to the county jailer, despite the
fact that the legislature had no power to review individual. actions taken
by the jailer, and even though the local legislature had not enacted any
ordinances or issued any regulations related to the policy area of issue,
leaving the jailer with no guidance from the supposed policymaker.m
The formalistic reliance on state law to determine policymaking
authority and the restrictive view of delegation of authority have al-
lowed municipalities, intentionally or unintentionally, to insulate them-
selves from § 1983 liability by divorcing final policymaking authority
from final authority to act. In the future, clever municipalities will
1 B° See Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1992). See infra notes 143-56 and
accompanying text for a discussion or the case.
tsi
182 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (6th Cir. 1990); Crowley v.
Prince George's County, 890 F.2d 683, 685-86 (4th Cir. 1989).
1811
 See Johnson, 908 F.2d at 685-87.
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place final policymaking authority in city councils, which will pass
appropriate legislation prohibiting the types of activities which could
give rise to § 1983 liability such as racial discrimination. The final
authority to act, however, will be placed outside the city council, with
those decisions being unreviewable by the city council—the policymak-
ing authority. In this manner, the municipalities can insulate their
policymakers, and therefore the municipality, from liability. 184 As all
municipalities have an obvious financial interest in reducing liability
for damages under § 1983, municipalities will be motivated to take
these steps even if the municipality is well-intentioned in its regard to
the upholding of federal rights. By so encouraging this behavior, the
sole reliance on state and local law to determine policymaking author-
ity turns on its head § 1983's original purpose of requiring local gov-
ernments to enforce the law equally. Instead, local governments are
allowed to choose which laws to enforce by restricting which official
actions municipalities will be liable for in federal court.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REDEFINING MUNICIPAL POLICYMAKER
The primary objective of § 1983 is to compel local officials to
uphold the law uniformly, an objective which is met through § 1983's
twin purposes of compensating victims whose federal rights have been
violated and deterring future unlawful conduct by municipal officials.
Section 1983 is an effective mechanism for controlling local officials
only when liability attaches to those actions for which the municipality
is capable of exercising some meaningful degree of control—actions
which the municipality could prevent from occurring or prevent from
becoming final. The rigid formalism of the current definition of mu-
nicipal policy, by taking the distinction between authority to act and
authority to set policy to its logical extreme, fails to impose liability for
actions taken by many officials over whom the municipality should be
exercising control.
The growth of the modern municipality into a large bureaucracy
with ever-growing responsibilities, particularly in the country's large
urban areas, created a tremendous number of officials and employees
with final authority to act and a tremendous need for high-ranking
officials to delegate authority—both authority to set policies and to
take action. By considering solely where state law purports to put
184 Note that nonpolicymakers can still be held liable for unconstitutional actions, but the
deep pocket of the municipality will not be available to remedy the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g.,
Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1991)
(police superintendent held personally liable for some discriminatory actions).
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policymaking authority, and refusing to consider where actual policy-
making authority resides in a municipality, the courts have eliminated
from consideration for municipal liability under § 1983 an enormous
number of actions taken by municipal officials. Consequently, with
much reduced municipal liability, victims are less often able to reach
municipal treasuries for compensation, and the authorized policymak-
ers will not have the financial incentives or prospective liability to spur
increased watchfulness over those countless officials who are given de
facto policymaking authority in the modern municipal bureaucratic
structure.
A proposal for redirecting the focus of § 1983 liability to allow
§ 1983 to influence the actions of local officials should encompass
those officials over whom municipalities are able to exert a meaningful
degree of control. The Supreme Court, however, is well settled on the
basic approach to municipal liability under § 1983. Liability will only
attach when local officials act pursuant to a municipal policy or cus-
tom. Moreover, after Pembaur and Praprotnik, it appears clear that a
municipal policy is any deliberate choice of action taken by an official
with final authority to enunciate a municipal policy. As the definition
of what is a policy is broad, while the definition of who may enact one
is narrow, efforts at expanding municipal liability should focus on the
conception of who may enact municipal policy. This Article suggests
that municipal policymakers, those officials with final authority to set
policy, should comprise the following three groups of municipal
officials: (1) elected officials; (2) officials or employees expressly vested
with policymaking authority by local law; and (3) de facto policymak-
ers. The final group, the de facto policymakers, include those officials
or employees who possess authority to take final action which is not
reviewable by any elected official or municipal official vested by state
law with policymaking authority, as well as those officials who take
actions which are not reviewed by the official designated by local law
or the policymaker when that official chooses not to exercise their
power to review. This proposed definition of municipal policymakers
fulfills not only § 1983's goals of deterring local officials from failing
to guarantee the rights of federal law to all and providing compensa-
tion to victims of official abuse, but also maintains the Supreme Court's
oft-repeated intention to maintain § 1983 as a fault-based system of
liability.
A. Elected Officials
Elected local officials are the essence of local government in a
democratic society. They are the repositories of the municipality's
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power, and citizens vest them with authority to act on the municipality's
behalf and to chart the municipality's overall course of action. Elected
officials are clearly the masters/employers rather than the ser-
vants/employees in a municipality. Thus, the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of respondeat superior does not preclude municipalities from
being held liable for the acts of their elected officials. Moreover, while
appointed officials are accountable to some other municipal official,
ultimately to an elected official, for their position, elected officials owe
their position only to the people. Generally, elected officials are not
accountable on a day-to-day basis to anyone in the municipal structure
and may be removed before their term expires only in the most ex-
treme circumstances. The sweeping power which these attributes give
to elected officials indicates that they should be viewed as per se
policymakers.
B. Officials Designated by Local Law
In addition to elected officials, municipal policymakers should
include those officials in whom state or local law has officially vested
policymaking authority in a given area. These are the officials desig-
nated by Praprotnik as policymakers,'" and their inclusion here is
straightforward. A municipality must act through its agents. If local law
designates certain officials as having final responsibility for setting the
municipality's policies, then the policies of those officials are properly
considered the policies of the municipality. Municipalities cannot
avoid the dictates of their own laws.
C. Officials with Delegated Policymaking Authority
The final category of officials who should be classified as munici-
pal policymakers are the de facto policymakers, those officials or em-
ployees who have, in practice, been delegated policymaking authority.
De facto delegation can occur in two ways. First, the municipality may
give an official or employee unreviewable authority to act. Second, the
de jure policymaker or elected official may refuse to exercise the power
to review the actions taken pursuant to internal appellate procedures.
The Supreme Court recognizes that de jure policymakers do delegate
their policymaking authority, although it has not encouraged a broad
reading of delegation. 186 Rather than embrace the concept of de facto
policymaking, the Court in essence has limited delegation to those
' 85 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1988).
186 Id. at 127.
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instances where policymaking is expressly rather than impliedly dele-
gated. As long as a de jure policymaker retains the power to make
general policy pronouncements, no delegation has occurred.
Courts interested in restricting municipal liability have seized
upon the Praprotnik plurality's distinction between express and implied
delegation. Consequently, a local legislature could be held to have not
delegated policymaking authority to executive branch officials in the
area of personnel decisions when the legislature retains the power to
enact ordinances reiterating constitutional requirements prohibiting
racially discriminatory hiring practices,' 87 or when the municipality's
charter itself includes such a blanket prohibition. 188 Courts interested
in expanding municipal liability, however, have followed the lead of
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Praprotnik and have found policy-
making authority delegated where total authority to act, unreviewable
by de jure policymakers, is delegated, even where de jure policymakers
may retain authority to enact broad policy statements. 189
Any attempt to expand the concept of implied delegation to those
situations where de jure policymakers fail to exercise their power to
review, however, is restrained by the acceptance by not only Justice
O'Connor's plurality but also Justice Brennan's concurrence in
Praprotnik that when a policymaker retains the power to review the
decisions of those empowered to act, whether or not that power is
exercised, policymaking authority has not been delegated. It is true
that justice Brennan did not acknowledge that there may be situations
where policymakers in practice never invoke their authority to review,
and thus that the "subordinate's decision is in effect the final munici-
pal pronouncement on the subject." 19° Although Justice Brennan sug-
gests that where the de jure policymaker refuses to review a decision
of a subordinate official, the question of municipal policy should go
to the jury, he nonetheless concurred in Praproinik's judgement de-
spite being faced by a municipal policymaker's refusal as a matter of
practice to review the decisions which caused the deprivation of a
federal right. 19 '
187 See Auriemma, 957 E2d at 397, 401. See also supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the case.
188 See. Crowley v. Prince George's County, 890 F.2c1 683, 686 (11th Cir. 1989), discussed supra
note 140.
189 See cases cited supra note 140.
19° Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 145.
191 In Praprotnik, the plaintiff had alleged, among other things, that his constitutional rights
had been violated by being transferred to a job below his qualifications with primarily clerical
responsibilities, but without a decrease in pay. The St. Louis Civil Service Commission had a
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This proposal, therefore, offers a more expansive view of munici-
pal liability than is presented by the two dominant views on the Su-
preme Court. A broad vision of implied delegation of policymaking
authority and consequently a broad reading of de facto policymakers
will force municipalities to take responsibility for those actions over
which it can reasonably be expected to control. It is this broad reading,
and not Justice Brennan's more limited Approach, that will eliminate
the "gaping hole" in municipal liability which presently exists, Conse-
quently, where the municipality determines that an official's actions
will not be susceptible to review by any other city official, then that
official's actions are in fact authorized by de jure policymakers and that
official is properly characterized as a policymaker. Thus, when a mayor
and a police chief are given complete authority over personnel deci-
sions, and those decisions are reviewable only in court and not by any
other municipal official or body, then the mayor and police chief have
sole control to determine the course of action taken by the municipal-
ity and the city is properly conceived as setting policy through them.
This should be true even if the city council retains the power to enact
ordinances but has no authority to review the mayor's actions to deter-
mine if they are in conformance with the ordinances,'" 2 and especially
so if the council retains only the power to enact ordinances but does
not act.'" If local city councils are viewed as the only potential policy-
maker in this situation, then the ordinances themselves may be chal-
lenged but every personnel action taken by an executive branch official
which is not taken directly pursuant to an ordinance is not cognizable
under § 1983 against municipalities because the executive branch
official is not a policymaker.
A municipality should also be held liable whenever a de jure
policymaker chooses not to exercise existing internal appeal proce-
dures after the alleged victim requests the available review. In that
situation, the municipality cannot insulate itself from liability by vesting
the power to review in a de jure policymaker and then having that
policymaker simply refuse to review the decision of the subordinate
officials. In its application, a conscious refusal to review is no different
from the municipality vesting unreviewable authority to act. Thus,
Praprotnik should have been decided differently, because the Civil
standing practice never to review transfers that did not involve pay decreases and thus did not
review the plaintiffs transfer. 485 U.S. at 115-16. See notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
I 92 This was the situation in Auriemma, 957 F.2d 397. See supra notes 143-56 and accompa-
nying text.
193 CI Johnson v, Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1287 (6th Cir. 1990), discussed supra- note
14L
728	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 34:693
Service Commission, the designated policymaker, refused to entertain
the plaintiff's appeal pursuant to an existing internal appellate proce-
dure. The municipality had effectively insulated an entire class of job
actions—transfers—from § 1983 liability. By refusing to review certain
decisions, however, the municipality had in effect authorized those
actions. Bringing these decisions under the umbrella of § 1983 liability
will force municipalities to expend more resources reviewing the deci-
sions of its subordinate officials, or to face the consequences of that
refusal to do so. This is appropriate as liability is created only for those
actions which the municipality may control, for those actions which
are neither random nor unauthorized.
Including de facto policymakers in the definition of municipal
officials with final authority to set policy not only accurately portrays
the power structure of the municipality, it also better serves the goals
of § 1983. Congress enacted § 1983 to provide a federal remedy against
local officials unwilling or unable to enforce federal law. If the power
to delegate is not recognized, however, and de facto policymakers
rejected, municipalities will have the authority to determine the scope
of § 1983 liability and thus to determine which federal rights it will
enforce. For example, local councils may enact ordinances blanketly
prohibiting employment discrimination, and then vest complete and
unreviewable authority to implement this ordinance in the mayor.
Alternatively, the council could retain the power to review in theory
but never exercise that power. Under the restricted view of delegation,
the municipality may disclaim any acts taken by the mayor or anyone
else in violation of this ordinance as not being authorized by a munici-
pal policymaker. Such a result turns § 1983 upside down, allowing
municipalities to determine which and when federal rights may be
vindicated in federal court, which is precisely the result Congress
attempted to eliminate when it passed § 1983 in 1871.
CONCLUSION
Municipal liability exists under § 1983 only when a municipal
official or employee deprives an individual of a federal right pursuant
to an official municipal policy. The Supreme Court has restricted
municipal liability by adopting a formalistic view of which municipal
officials may take actions considered to be municipal policies. The
current definition of municipal policy reduces opportunities for mu-
nicipal liability and thwarts § 1983's remedial purposes. First, by allow-
ing municipalities to insulate municipal policymakers by eliminating
their right to review decisions made by those officials with authority to
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act, municipalities are able to determine which actions taken by which
officials will subject the municipality to liability. This stands in stark
contrast to Congress's intention in enacting § 1983 of providing a
federal remedy to individuals injured by a local official's inability or
unwillingness to enforce the law on an equal basis. Second, by reducing
municipal liability to the actions taken by only a select few officials, the
Supreme Court has reduced the fiscal incentives for municipal officials
to ensure that actions are taken in accordance with federal law. A
definition of policymakers that includes elected officials, as well as both
de jure and de facto policymakers, more accurately reflects the actual
distribution of policymaking authority in the modern municipality and
maintains § 1983 as a fault-based system of liability.
